Independent analysis of
Sri Lankan equities.

A regulated lender judged on capital and liquidity; two holding companies judged on interest cover. Tier 1 at 22.43% but the liquidity buffer at 101.98% of floor. BIL earns Rs 4.6bn a quarter and owes lenders Rs 10.0bn.

33 months on the watch list, four suspension deferments and four warrant-date extensions. 99.79% of the Rs 1.28bn warrant cash comes from two shareholders. Every figure traced to a named public document.

Sri Lanka's listed construction and building-materials ecosystem, reduced to 1,334 figures that each carry the document and page they came from. Two of these eight are the same group — ACL Cables holds 79.3% of Kelani Cables, so its consolidated figures already contain them. Includes a point-in-time earnings multiple using only earnings published by each trading day, and three defects found in the sources themselves: every supplied market date was one day early, and two annual reports contradict their own per-share history.

Every one of eight listed licensed finance companies grew loans 39–91% last year, and none funded it primarily with deposits. Tier 1 headroom over each company's own disclosed minimum now ranges from 13.42pp down to 0.55pp — the dispersion is in capital, not profit. Includes a full event dashboard on LOLC Finance's Rs 16.1bn share repurchase, corrected onto regulatory (not accounting) capital.

Group EBITDA is up 75% and CODSL, WCT, and BYD are all finally profitable — yet the adjusted share price is up only 19.3% in 6.5 years vs. the ASPI's +256%. Twelve hypotheses tested against 6.5 years of daily trading data, CSE filings, and the FY2025/26 Annual Report: the nominal subdivision, crossing trades, ownership shifts, and why FCF conversion is only ~8% of EBITDA.

The world's only pure-play Ceylon vein graphite producer — 86.46% owned by German GK (being acquired by Asbury Carbons for USD 65M). Operating cash flows are high quality (104.5% OCF conversion). But at 53× P/E, 32× EBITDA, and FCF yield below 1%, the market is pricing a battery-grade anode pivot and EV supply chain revenues that are MoU-stage, not contract-stage. Fundamental fair value: LKR 21–38. Jun 23 volume spike (805K shares, Rs. 120.8M) shows the stock remains driven by narrative, not earnings.

Full sector comparison of all six listed Sri Lanka renewable energy stocks — spider-web scorecard, margin wars, debt stress test, capacity league table, individual flags, and DCF scenarios. VPEL wins on fundamentals (83.5% GP, D/E 0.23x, P/E ~5.4x — even bear-case DCF Rs. 18 is above today's Rs. 15.1). HPWR is most at risk (D/E 1.57x, interest cover 1.5x). PAP's 150% capacity jump in FY26 is the growth story of the sector.

Two profitable hospitals carry Rs 16.9Bn in related-party loans, part directed at a parent with negative equity of Rs 44.7Bn. Impairments taken two years running. Then on 15 Jun 2026, ASIR sold 3.63% of AMSL — value moving the same direction as the loans.

CEO explained Bangladesh, Hormuz, R&D, Mirotone and emulsion. Four claims hold up against independent sources. One (Hormuz "sorted in a few months") is true but severely understated — an active war closed the Strait since 4 Mar 2026, EIA expects normalisation in early 2027. One emulsion share figure doesn't reconcile. Updated DCF: LKR 24 base vs ~LKR 39 market.

GWP +31% to a record LKR 8.65 Bn — PAT fell 23%. Q1 2026 made it sharper: GWP +42%, PAT −61%. The bond-cycle engine cooled and the related-party associate (First Capital) flipped to a loss. ~98% payout pipes cash to a lower-rated parent. Score: 5/10.

BRWN EPS crashed from Rs.+152 to Rs.−75 the moment bargain-purchase gains dried up. BIL's accounting trick scaled to Rs.98.7Bn yet group equity fell Rs.15.3Bn. LOFC borrowings exploded 527% in one year.

Tax shields eroding. Rs. 2.2Bn trapped in CEB receivables. Rs. 708M SPPA revenue gone. Mannar IPO cost 2.7x the original plan. But IFC backs a 100 MW solar deal and Sri Lanka needs 70% renewables by 2030. Includes interactive DCF.

Operating CF collapsed from +Rs.18bn to −Rs.10.5bn. Short-term debt up 50% to Rs.152.9bn. Receivables +40% vs revenue +19%. Rights issue + debentures plugged a genuine cash hole. Includes interactive DCF with 11 flex sliders.

A binding 7 Jul 2026 agreement hands control of a company that hasn't made asphalt since 2021 to a well-capitalised consortium. Stock +60% in a day. A Rs.1.85bn revalued plot, a stalled below-book land sale, and a seller's stake that matches to the exact share since 2020.

Price down only 8.5% from the January peak — but daily turnover has collapsed over 70% and foreign investors sold a net Rs.33.7bn in H1. A data-driven look at the rate shock, rupee slide, and the structural gaps slowing recovery.

Sri Lanka's ride-hailing monopoly at Rs.162.25 — but NAV is the wrong lens. Revenue +49% for two years running, Rs.84.5Bn GTV, 35% EBIT margin, Rs.2.46Bn FCF. We build the 9-year DCF: bear Rs.87, base Rs.239, bull Rs.315.

Parent equity at −LKR 66.56B, accumulated losses −LKR 90.94B, gross group debt LKR 122.8B. EY going concern flag, SEC-deferred trading suspension, directors' bank accounts frozen.

Auditor disclaimer of opinion. Negative equity −LKR 15.1B. Revenue down 50%+ in six quarters. Both core subsidiaries in disposal. Hard regulatory deadline: 11 June 2026 or mandatory trading suspension.

PAT growth 144% alongside −LKR 3.84B operating cash flow. The flagship USD 250M Port City project sits at the private parent, not the listed PLC. Retail investors own the shell.

Big first-day pops predict bad 3-year returns (correlation −0.38 across 45 cohorts). 60% of all IPOs lose money in 3 years. We test the framework live: SK hynix (fwd P/S ~4.5×, profitable) vs. SpaceX (~94× sales at IPO) — the two largest listings in history, opposite buckets.

$4.94B net loss + $6.36B xAI drain. 88.5% insider voting control. Our DCF produces bear $50B / base $120B / bull $420B — all far below $2T. Index fund weight: ~4.3% S&P 500, ~8.3% Nasdaq-100. The forced buying problem explained.