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DEEP-DIVE · DCF VALUATION · HAYL.N0000

Hayleys PLC FY26: Half-Trillion Revenue,
Negative Operating Cash Flow

The Rs. 585bn revenue milestone is real. So is the collapse in cash conversion, the 50% surge in short-term debt, and the Rs. 79bn working-capital trap. This is not a distress story — Fitch says AAA(lka) — but the quality of FY26's "record" is deeply poor. Here's what actually happened, with every number sourced from the audited filings, and a DCF you can flex yourself.
Ticker HAYL.N0000 FY26 Revenue Rs. 585.0bn Market Price Rs. 234.50 P/B 1.55x Rating Fitch AAA(lka) Stable Data Source FY26 Unaudited Interim (29 May 2026) + FY25 Audited
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Not Investment Advice. This analysis is by DamithInvest / inwestout.com for educational purposes. The author is not SEC-registered. All analysis, valuations, and model outputs are personal opinions based on public filings — not buy/sell/hold recommendations. FY26 figures are unaudited interim; audited annual may restate. Conduct your own due diligence.
Revenue FY26
Rs. 585bn
+19% YoY | Half-trillion crossed
EBIT FY26
Rs. 49.4bn
Margin 8.4% vs 9.9% — compressed
EBITDA FY26
Rs. 64.8bn
+8% YoY | Margin ~11.1%
PAT (Parent)
Rs. 14.1bn
Net margin to parent: 2.4%
Basic EPS
Rs. 18.71
+4.5% YoY (post-rights dilution)
Operating CF
−Rs. 10.5bn
vs +Rs. 18.0bn FY25 — headline killer
Short-Term Debt
Rs. 152.9bn
+50.1% YoY — skyrocketing
Total Debt
Rs. 289.7bn
LT Rs. 92.9bn + ST Rs. 152.9bn + Current Rs. 43.9bn
Trade Receivables
Rs. 195.7bn
+40.3% vs revenue +19% — stretching
Inventories
Rs. 116.4bn
+26.6% — building faster than sales
Net Assets/Share
Rs. 150.75
Market price Rs. 234.50 = 1.55x book
Total Equity
Rs. 170.5bn
Parent Rs. 113.2bn + NCI Rs. 57.3bn
01 The Verdict — Manageable, But Deteriorating on Every Axis That Matters
SHORT ANSWER

Hayleys is not on the edge of distress — Fitch AAA(lka), a 51% controlling owner who just re-subscribed Rs. 4.6bn into the rights issue, and falling rates provide a real safety net. But the quality of FY26's record revenue is poor, and the two capital raises (Rs. 5.88bn debenture + Rs. 9bn rights issue) were plugging a genuine cash hole, not funding opportunistic expansion.

The single number that confirms the thesis: operating cash flow collapsed from +Rs. 17.99bn in FY25 to −Rs. 10.50bn in FY26. Cash generated from operations went from Rs. 31.44bn to Rs. 1.92bn. The Rs. 9bn rights issue + Rs. 5.88bn debenture + ~Rs. 15bn net new borrowing were used to fund a Rs. 43bn pre-financing cash deficit. They then paid Rs. 8.9bn in dividends — partly to the 51% owner who re-subscribed Rs. 4.6bn of that back into the rights. Circular, and worth watching.

The whole FY27 thesis rests on one question: does the Rs. 79bn receivables/inventory build unwind (demand-backed, converts to cash) or does it persist (stale stock, slow collections, forces another raise)? Watch H1 FY27 operating cash flow above all else.

02 Red Flags vs Green Flags — From the Actual Filings FY26 vs FY25

Red Flags (Hard Numbers)

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Operating CF: −Rs. 10.5bn — from +Rs. 18.0bn. The headline killer. Growth is being funded by debt, not cash generation.
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Cash from operations: Rs. 1.92bn — from Rs. 31.44bn (−94%). Earnings simply not converting to cash at the group level.
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Trade receivables: Rs. 195.7bn (+40.3%) vs revenue growth of only +19%. Collections are stretching. Add non-current receivables Rs. 30.4bn → total Rs. 226.1bn.
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Inventories: Rs. 116.4bn (+26.6%) — building faster than sales. WC intensity spiked from 30% to 38.7% of revenue.
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Short-term debt: Rs. 152.9bn (+50.1%) from Rs. 101.8bn. The most alarming single line in the balance sheet. Plus current LTD +42% to Rs. 43.9bn.
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EBIT margin: 8.4% vs 9.9% — 143bps compression. Gross margin also slipped (23.3% vs 23.9%). Distribution +33%, admin +19%.
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Direct interest in COGS: Rs. 6.57bn (+57%) — the embedded finance book is absorbing more and more interest cost that bypasses the P&L interest line.
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Parent company: loss-making — company-level PAT Rs. −1.44bn vs Rs. +3.99bn FY25. Rs. 6.89bn impairment on Maldives resort subsidiary.
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Payables vs receivables asymmetry: Trade payables grew only +1.5% (Rs. 85.7bn vs 84.4bn) while receivables grew +40%. Hayleys is financing its customers without stretching suppliers — the core WC cash drain.

Green Flags

Fitch AAA(lka) Stable reaffirmed — highest national rating. Refinancing access is not in question. This is the main firewall between "tight" and "distressed."
EBIT and EBITDA still growing (+2% and +8%). Every segment was operating-profit positive. The business is earning — just not converting it.
Consumer & Retail: revenue +44%, result +70% — the domestic franchise is genuinely strong and the fastest-growing segment.
Q4 revenue Rs. 164.6bn (+29%) — accelerating top-line in the final quarter. If this carries into FY27, the WC build may prove demand-backed.
CBSL policy rate falling context — rates have been cut 825bps over 24 months (to FY26). The Rs. 152.9bn in ST debt rolls at lower rates over time, relieving the interest burden directly.
Controlling-owner alignment: Dhammika Perera (51%) re-subscribed Rs. 4.6bn of the Rs. 9bn rights issue. Insiders don't fund a raise they expect to destroy value.
Maldives resort disposal: USD 17.25m sale removes the loss-making discontinued operation (Rs. 1.23bn drag) and the Rs. 6.9bn parent-level impairment that hit holdco equity.
Asset backing: net assets/share Rs. 150.75; P/B 1.55x — not stretched for a group owning listed subsidiaries (Dipped Products, Haycarb, Hayleys Fabric, Talawakelle, Hayleys Leisure).
Finance income surging: Rs. 9.13bn (+31%) vs finance cost Rs. 19.93bn (+8%). The embedded finance/leasing book is earning. Part of the COGS interest cost is economic, not purely a debt burden.
03 P&L From the Filing — The Margin Compression Story Rs. '000 | Audited FY25 vs Unaudited FY26
Line Item FY26 (Rs. bn) FY25 (Rs. bn) Change % Commentary
Revenue585.02490.56+19.3%Half-trillion milestone; Q4 alone Rs. 164.6bn (+29%)
Cost of Sales442.27369.06+19.8%Growing slightly faster than revenue — margin pressure
Direct Interest (in COGS)6.574.18+57.3%Embedded finance/leasing cost — fastest-growing cost item
Gross Profit136.18117.32+16.1%Gross margin: 23.3% vs 23.9% — mild but real slip
Distribution Expenses23.7417.85+33.0%Consumer & Retail expansion driving higher distribution
Admin Expenses65.6255.07+19.2%In line with revenue — no operating leverage visible
EBIT (Results from Ops)49.3748.40+2.0%EBIT margin: 8.4% vs 9.9% — 143bps compression on 19% revenue growth
Finance Income9.136.96+31.2%Finance/leasing book earning well; partial offset
Finance Cost(19.93)(18.40)+8.3%Growing, but less than revenue growth — some relief
PBT (Continuing)38.0436.71+3.6%PBT margin: 6.5% vs 7.5%
Tax Expense(14.59)(12.86)+13.4%Effective tax rate: 38.4% vs 35.0% — rising tax drag
PAT (Continuing)23.4523.85−1.7%Continuing ops PAT declined despite +19% revenue
Discontinued Ops Loss(1.23)(1.34)Maldives resort — now being sold for USD 17.25m
Total PAT (Group)22.2222.51−1.3%Near-flat on 19% revenue growth
PAT to Parent Owners14.0513.45+4.5%Parent margin: 2.4% vs 2.7%. EPS: Rs. 18.71 vs Rs. 17.91
PAT to Non-Controlling Int.8.179.06−9.8%Subsidiaries less profitable than the group average
04 The Working Capital Trap & Debt Structure Balance Sheet · Rs. bn
The core problem: Rs. 79.4bn of working capital built up in FY26 while payables barely moved. Hayleys is financing its customers (receivables +40%) and building inventory (26%) at the same rate interest-bearing debt is exploding (+50%). This WC build is the proximate cause of negative operating cash flow and forced the capital raises.
Balance Sheet ItemFY26 (Rs. bn)FY25 (Rs. bn)Change% Change
Trade Receivables (Current)195.7139.4+56.3bn+40.3%
Non-Current Trade Receivables30.419.3+11.2bn+57.8%
Inventories116.491.9+24.5bn+26.6%
Trade Payables85.784.4+1.3bn+1.5%
Net WC (Recv+Inv−Payables)226.4147.0+79.4bn+54.0%
WC Intensity (% revenue)38.7%30.0%+8.7ppSurging
DEBT STRUCTURE
LT Interest-Bearing Borrowings92.971.7+21.3bn+29.7%
Current Portion of LT Debt43.930.9+13.0bn+41.8%
Short-Term Borrowings152.9101.8+51.0bn+50.1%
Total Debt (Gross)289.7204.4+85.3bn+41.7%
Cash & Short-Term Deposits54.051.7+2.3bn+4.4%
Net Debt235.7152.7+83.0bn+54.3%
Total Equity170.5144.1+26.4bn+18.3%
Net Debt / Total Equity1.38x1.06xClimbing
EQUITY & CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Parent Equity113.293.1+20.1bn+21.6%
— incl. Rights Issue Pending Allotment9.0New
Non-Controlling Interests57.351.0+6.3bn+12.4%
Shares Outstanding (post-rights)~751mn~706mn+45mn+6.4%
Net Assets / Share (parent)Rs. 150.75Rs. 131.93+14.3%
THE CIRCULAR CAPITAL FLOW

Hayleys raised Rs. 5.88bn (debentures) + Rs. 9bn (rights) = Rs. 14.88bn in new capital, took on ~Rs. 85bn of net new debt, and ran a Rs. 43bn pre-financing cash deficit — then paid Rs. 8.9bn in dividends to parent shareholders out of borrowed/raised money. A chunk of those dividends flowed to the 51% owner (Dhammika Perera's entities: ~Rs. 4.5bn) who then re-subscribed Rs. 4.6bn into the rights issue. The net economic effect: the controlling shareholder received dividends and re-injected approximately the same amount as "fresh" equity capital. Legally and technically fine, but worth understanding if you're modelling capital allocation quality.

05 Interactive DCF Valuation — Build Your Own View FCFF · 5-Year Explicit + Terminal
Move the sliders below to flex the key assumptions. The model is a consolidated FCFF DCF anchored on FY26 audited-basis financials. Important caveat before you read the output: a straight DCF is a weak primary tool for Hayleys because (1) ~Rs. 6.6bn of "direct interest cost" sits inside COGS — the embedded finance/leasing book means subtracting all Rs. 290bn of debt over-penalizes equity; (2) ~Rs. 57bn belongs to minorities. The market uses NAV/sum-of-parts (1.55x book). Treat the DCF as "what does today's cash generation support" — not "fair value."

Hayleys PLC — FCFF Valuation Model

Based on FY26 Unaudited Interim Filing · Revenue Rs. 585bn · EBIT Rs. 49.4bn · D&A Rs. 15.5bn · Shares ~751mn

8.0%
8.5%
2.6%
5.3%

0%
30%
38%

13.0%
5.0%

236bn
57bn
Implied Equity Value Per Share
Rs. —
vs market price Rs. 234.50
PV of Explicit FCFFs (Y1–Y5)
PV of Terminal Value
Enterprise Value
TV as % of EV
Less: Net Debt
Less: Minorities
Equity Value (Rs. bn)
Implied P/B (parent equity)
5-Year FCFF Projection (Rs. bn)
MetricY1Y2Y3Y4Y5
Sensitivity — Value/Share vs WACC & EBIT Margin
Why DCF is a weak primary lens for Hayleys: (1) Part of the Rs. 290bn debt funds earning finance/leasing assets embedded in COGS — reducing net debt toward Rs. 150–190bn is a legitimate adjustment, use the slider. (2) Terminal value is 70%+ of EV at current cash generation, making the output highly sensitive to small assumption changes. (3) The market prices this on NAV/sum-of-parts (listed subsidiaries: Dipped Products, Haycarb, Hayleys Fabric, Talawakelle, Hayleys Leisure). The DCF's honest message: at current cash conversion, the price embeds a significant balance-sheet normalization bet.
06 What to Watch — The Five Signals That Resolve the Thesis
WATCH #1 · H1 FY27 (Oct 2026)
Operating Cash Flow Direction
If H1 FY27 OCF turns positive (even Rs. 5–8bn), the Rs. 79bn WC build is unwinding and the bull case opens. If OCF stays negative, the FY26 pattern is structural — expect another capital raise in FY27.
WATCH #2 · Quarterly
Receivables Days Outstanding (DSO)
Current DSO is elevated. Watch for receivables growing slower than revenue — the key sign collections are catching up. If receivables grow faster than revenue for a second year, the credit quality of the book is in question.
WATCH #3 · Short-Term
Maldives Resort Sale Completion
USD 17.25m (~Rs. 5.7bn) in proceeds removes the ongoing discontinued-ops loss and the Rs. 6.89bn parent impairment. Watch for the formal completion announcement and whether proceeds reduce parent-company net debt.
WATCH #4 · CBSL Meetings
Interest Rate Path
The May 2026 surprise 100bps hike (to 8.75%) directly hit Hayleys' Rs. 152.9bn short-term debt. Every 100bps of ST rate = ~Rs. 1.53bn of additional annual interest. Watch for the CBSL signalling a pause or cut — that's the refinancing relief signal.
WATCH #5 · Annual Report
Audited FY26 Annual Report
Current data is unaudited interim (signed 29 May 2026). The audited annual report may restate certain lines — particularly around the discontinued operations impairment, WC provisioning, and fair value of listed subsidiaries. Any material restatement changes the equity bridge.
BEAR RISK
WC Build Persisting into FY27
If Q4 FY26's +29% revenue surge was pull-forward demand (pre-fuel-hike stocking, post-Cyclone Ditwah recovery) that doesn't sustain, the Rs. 116bn inventory and Rs. 226bn receivables become stale assets. In that scenario, short-term debt rolls at rising rates with no cash paydown in sight, and the debenture/rights cycle repeats.
07 Sources

Hayleys PLC — FY26 Unaudited Interim Report (12 months to 31 March 2026, signed 29 May 2026)

Hayleys PLC — Q3 FY26 Interim Report (9 months to 31 December 2025)

Daily FT — Hayleys tops half-trillion revenue milestone

All Rs. figures converted from Rs. '000 as stated in the CSE filings. FY26 is unaudited; audited annual report may restate. Market price Rs. 234.50 used as at research date. DCF model is illustrative — small input changes produce large output swings due to high leverage and high LKR discount rates. This is not investment advice.